The Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims is made by the Master of the Rolls as Head of Civil Justice
Read this, with particular emphasis on Section 5.
These are the guidelines which the courts must follow!
With thanks to Angel for the in-depth research, a true BoEVAT Warrior!
Click the above link to download the PDF
This is a very interesting case that demonstrates the power of the Bills of Exchange Act, and the use of Notices.
The whole document is good reading, but if you wish to go straight to the juicy bits, you can skip to Page 9 for the letter to the Adjudicator, and read on from there.
I find it most interesting that Warrington Borough Council (WBC) did '...not contest the appeal', when they seemed so righteous and certain beforehand. How the mighty have fallen!
What changed their minds?
I think WBC were 'persuaded' to check their over-inflated egos and drop it before the case escalated into the public domain, or worst still, found its way into a Crown Court or High Court (Courts de Jure) and therefore before a jury.
The ramifications of this would mean that every council and every parking bandit company in the UK would have to pay back all the money they have extorted from us for at least the last six years. Just imagine.
This would make the PPI banking scam look like child's play.
Rice vs Connolly
Another very interesting case which gives lawful precedent for refusing to give your details prior to arrest.
Enfarcement Orifices Enforcement Officers will claim that refusing to give them your details prior to arrest makes you guilty of obstruction or obstructing a constable when in the execution of their duty.
Both police and litter bandits are rather fond of this trick.
The claim is ludicrous because the very first thing you are told when actually being arrested under PACE is, "You don't have to say anything...".
See my point?
Rice vs Connolly has been used effectively in a few cases, for instance:
Police Powers to Stop Vehicles
Lodwick v. Saunders (1985) 80 Cr App R 304, concerned the extent of police powers to detain a vehicle (though such detention was subsequent to a stop by uniformed officers). The defendant had initially stopped his vehicle but then tried to drive off and was prevented by an officer who removed the key from the ignition (and was assaulted by the defendant for so doing). Of relevance the court referred to the common law power of the officers as well as the (then) s.159 of the Road Traffic Act 1972. The court said (pp.308-10):
“From the exhaustive and helpful arguments addressed to us … it is unfortunately all too clear that in the absence of statutory power the right of a constable who has lawfully, by common law or statutory power, caused a motor vehicle to stop, to detain that vehicle and its driver whilst inquiries into the suspected commission of offences proceeds, lacks precise judicial definition.' … 'In the context of the present case it is the duty of the police to detect crime and to bring an offender to justice which is of particular significance. One of the questions which arises is how far a police constable is entitled to go in questioning and detaining for that purpose a suspect and detaining the motor vehicle of which he is the driver.
In Waterfield (1963) 48 Cr App R 42, 48, 49;  1 QB 164, 171, 172, Ashworth J stated:
“Thus, while it is no doubt right to say in general terms that police constables have a duty to prevent crime and a duty, when crime is committed, to bring the offender to justice, it is also clear from the decided cases that when the execution of these general duties involves interference with the person or property of a private person, the powers of constables are not unlimited … Unquestionably the defendant assaulted Constable Cairns but, so the justices found, he was not guilty of an offence because the constable had no right to prevent him from driving away; it was an act outwith the execution of the constable's duty. It is well established that the police have no general power to detain any person for questioning. A constable may ask a question of a person, but he cannot (a) require that person to stop to be questioned, and (b) he cannot demand an answer to any question; the right to silence in such a circumstance is predominant.”